continue to rise, these practices supported a widely praised initiative to increase homeownership in america. it reached unsustainable levels and became too much of a good thing. like all the players in the home mortgage market bank managers at wamu and elsewhere mistakenly believed that they were effectively averting risks by moving loans off their books and securitizing them. similarly, homeowners perceived little risk in their adjustable rate mortgages because they thought they could sell their homes at a profit before rate resets kicked in. investors believed mortgage-backed securities carried little risk because credit agency -- credit rating agencies rated them highly. those proved misplaced when the market collapsed and the risks turned out to be all too real. the fallout hit financial institutions large and small with state and federal charters overseen by every bank regulators. since wamu's failure the ots has taken lessons to heart from our own review to the thrifts and the inspector general's mature loss reviews and we have made strides to address the resulting recommendations. we